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I. INTRODUCTION
During the five-year autonomy period negotiated as part of the Oslo
Peace Accords,' the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) drafted and
finalized the Basic Law2 which was supposed to serve as an interim con-
stitution.3 This document, finished in October 1997, was an attempt by
1 Between September 13, 1993 and September 27, 1995, five agreements were signed
by the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The two main
agreements are: the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
(DOP) of 13 September 1993 (also referred to as the Oslo I Agreement) and the Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Interim Agreement) of 28 September
1995 (also referred to as the Oslo II Agreement). See RAjA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCuPA-
TION To INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 11
(1997)[hereinafter SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION]. For an analysis of the legal status of
Palestine during the interim period, see Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The
International Legal Status of Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 DENY. J. INT'LL.
& POL'Y 27 (1997). For an analysis of the issues that need to be addressed if and when
the final status negotiations with Israel get underway, see generally John Quigley, The
Role of Law in a Palestinian-Israeli Accommodation, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 351
(1999).
2 See THE PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW (Third Reading) (1998) (Palestine), translated by
Saladin Al-Jurf [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. The text of the PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW is re-
printed in the Appendix to this issue of the Case Western Reserve Journal of Interna-
tional Law. 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 495 (1999). Under the Oslo Accords, the PLC
is authorized to make a Basic Law. Oslo II, Art. I1 (7), reprinted in SHEHADEH, FROM
OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 211.
3 See generally Adrien Wing, The New South African Constitution: An Example for
Palestinian Consideration, 7 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 105 (1992-94) (discussing the 1993
interim South African constitution); ADRIEN KATHERINE WING, DEMOCRACY, CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND THE FUTURE STATE OF PALESTINE (1994) (discussing the 1994, or third
draft of the Palestinian Basic Law); From Liberation to State Building in South Africa:
Some Constitutional Considerations for Palestine, in LIBERATION, DEMOCRATIZATION,
AND TRANSITIONS TO STATEHOOD IN THE THIRD WORLD 91 (May Jayyusi ed.,
1998)[hereinafter From Liberation].
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the democratically elected parliamentarians of autonomous Palestine,
representing the Palestinian people living in the West Bank, Gaza, and
East Jerusalem,4 to join the community of nations possessing democratic
constitutions. Unfortunately, the Basic Law remains unsigned by Pales-
tinian National Authority (PNA) President Yasser Arafat,5 and he contin-
ues to govern in a constitutional vacuum. The autonomy period itself has
expired, and Arafat had threatened to unilaterally declare the existence of
the Palestinian state on May 4, 1999.6 Thus, the Basic Law was not put
into effect during its intended time period. It is my view, however, that
the Basic Law can serve an important legal function in the future. It can
be used as the basis for creating the constitution of any future independ-
ent state of Palestine. I base this conclusion upon my seventeen-year ex-
pertise in the region, which includes serving as an independent consultant
to the PLC on the drafting of the Basic Law in 1996. Although Palestine
was not an independent state at the time of the drafting of the Basic Law,
it was evident to many of the drafters that the document would hopefully
4 Pursuant to the Oslo Accords, elections were held in January 1996, and Palestinians
living in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem were permitted to vote for a President
and for members of the PLC. It is interesting to note that East Jerusalemites were permit-
ted to vote, even though the status of Jerusalem was an issue to be left to final status
negotiations, and none of the Israeli government land proposals contemplate permitting
East Jerusalem to return to Arab control, ie. the pre-1967 war situation. I will use the
term "autonomous Palestine" to refer to the areas of the West Bank and Gaza that are
under control of the Palestine National Authority (PNA). Palestinians living outside of
the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem are left in legal limbo as a result of the Ac-
cords. For arguments that such Palestinians are entitled to a right to return to Palestine,
see John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 HARv. INT'LL.J. 171
(1998); DONNA E. ARzT, REFUGEES INTO CITIZENS: PALESTINIANS AND THE END OF THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1997) (setting forth four negotiation principles which could
form the framework for resolving the Palestinian refugee crisis). Compare Justus R.
Weiner, The Palestinian Refugees' "Right to Return" and the Peace Process, 20 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 45-52 (1997) (calling for the creation of an arbitration tribunal
to bear the political and financial claims of the displaced Palestinians as a final resolu-
tion to the problem).
5 Arafat's failure to sign will be discussed infra at note 63 and accompanying text.
6 Western and Arab nations have urged Arafat to hold off, worrying that a declaration
of statehood would worsen peace prospects with Israel. At the time, Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Netanyahu had warned that a unilateral declaration of statehood could bring the peace
process to collapse. See Arafat Ready to Discuss Statehood, Associated Press, Feb. 22,
1999, available in 1999 WL 12932378. Israel held elections on May 17, 1999, in which
Netanyahu was not re-elected as Prime Minister.
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be used as a basis for creating an independence constitution, if not consti-
.tuting that new document itself.7
The purpose of this symposium Article is to examine selected
strengths and weaknesses of this would-be embryonic constitution and
make some preliminary assessments about the democratic nature of the
text and its prospects for having any real life impact in Palestine upon
implementation.
A constitution manifests a state's experiences and aspirations. Constitu-
tion-making remains the preeminent (and institutionalized) constituting
act of a country. It serves as a marker and rewriting of where the state
has been and expresses where it would like to be going .. . .The
conflicts between the limiting/legitimating and the self-defining/re-
uniting/aspiring aspects of a constitutional text create discontinuities
and contradictions noticeable to any reader .... Careful analysis of the
text uncovers tensions and contradictions that are hidden within the
text, as well as gaps left by conflicts so great that they could not be
hidden and therefore have been omitted.8
An examination of the Basic Law will reveal the current strains and
conflicts extant in autonomous Palestine and any future independent Pal-
estine. Its struggle for survival occurs within the context of an unipolar
world order with the United States as the sole superpower, and an ongo-
ing Israeli occupation in the Palestinian Territories. The tension is exac-
erbated by a region lacking true democratic role models and by incidents
of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism coupled with terrorism by Jewish
settlers as well. Such incidents by Islamic forces have led to increasing
pressure by the United States and Israel on Arafat to round up and im-
prison all those dissenting from the peace process.
Can democracy be born in such harsh conditions? What role does
law, and in particular the constitution, play? To answer such existential
questions, the Basic Law cannot be examined in isolation. It must be ex-
plored within the context of the potential for constitutionalism as well.
Democracy is in part constitutionalism, which "has to do with making a
state into a rechtstaat or an 6tat de droit - a state that is governed by its
own public law. This kind of state is accountable; it has elements of leg-
islative control or a monitoring supervision of the executive. The admini-
7 Interviews with various members of the PLC (June, July, Aug. 1996 and Nov. 1997)
[hereinafter Interviews].
8 Christopher P. Barton, The Paradox of a Revolutionary Constitution: A Reading of
the Nicaraguan Constitution, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 49, 53-54 (1988).
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stration of justice is automotized through the judicial system." In future
scholarship, I hope to further explore the issues raised in this Article and
examine the development of Palestinian constitutionalism by reviewing
the implementation of the Basic Law or its successor in its first few years
of operation.'"
While the actual implementation of the Basic Law cannot be ex-
plored yet, Part II of this Article will detail structural and cultural factors
influencing the future democratization and constitutionalism process in
Palestine. The factors discussed include the unipolar world order, na-
tional economy, education, political pluralization, communi-
tarian/hierarchial society, distrust of authority, and the multilayered legal
regime.
Part III of this Article highlights certain textual features of the Pales-
tinian Basic Law. In this part, I will make reference to choices made by
another society, South Africa, in its constitution-making process. While
the historical, political, and legal differences are numerous, certain simi-
larities between the two societies are undeniable. Over the years, many
comparisons have been made between the liberation struggles of South
Africa and Palestine. Many considered the African National Congress
(ANC) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), both accredited
United Nations General Assembly Permanent Observers, to be fighting
variants of minority settler regimes. Military connections and strategic
alliances between the enemies of the liberation movements, Israel and
apartheid South Africa were well-documented." In both societies, groups
who felt oppressed waged both nonviolent and violent warfare against
their oppressors. In both countries, the oppressed were not allowed to
govern themselves and were subject to military or emergency rule, with
well-documented international human rights violations.' 2 In both in-
stances, liberation movements formerly branded as terrorist ultimately sat
down to negotiate the transition of power. Both societies have experi-
9 Crawford Young, The Debate on Constitutionalism in Africa, in THE U.S. CONSTI-
TUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA 125, 127 (Kevin W. Thompson ed., 1990).
10 This research will result in a book tentatively entitled PALESTINIAN DEMOCRACY?: A
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE.
1 See, e.g., JAMES ADAMS, TE UNNATURAL ALLIANCE (1984) (discussing the connec-
tions between South Africa and Palestine); JANE HUNTER, ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY:
SOUTH AFRICA AND CENTRAL AMERICA (1987). Needless to say, many supporters of Is-
rael deeply resented any comparisons to the apartheid regime.
12 With respect to Palestine, see, for example, Richard Falk & Burns Weston, The
Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza, 32
HARv. INT'LL. J. 129 (1991).
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enced the fear articulated by South African Constitutional Court Justice
Albie Sachs:
[T]he elimination of [outside oppression] does not.., guarantee free-
dom even for the formerly oppressed. History unfortunately records
many examples of freedom-fighters of one generation becoming op-
pressors of the next. Sometimes the very qualities of determination and
sense of being involved in a historic endeavour which give freedom-
fighters the courage to raise the banner of liberty in the face of barba-
rous repression, transmute themselves into sources of authoritarianism
and historical forced-marches later on. On other occasions, the habits of
clandestinity and mistrust, of tight discipline and centralized control,
without which the freedom fighting nucleus would have been wiped
out, continue with dire results into the new society.
13
South Africa appears to be avoiding this fate.'4 After the first five
years of democratic government in South Africa, the result is majority
rule in a fledgling independent democracy. In Palestine, the end result is
still unclear. I hope that my comparative insights will be enhanced by my
having served as an advisor in both societies. In addition to the previ-
ously mentioned service in Palestine, I acted as an advisor to the African
National Congress Constitutional Committee in the years leading up to
the adoption of the 1993 interim constitution. Interestingly, the only con-
stitution that the PLC asked that I translate from English into Arabic was
the 1996 South African document.
Part IV of the Article is a very brief case study of women's rights
since the tension between an inegalitarian past and the potential for con-
stitutionally mandated equality in the future is most evident for this sec-
tor of society. Part V concludes that the Basic Law constitutes an embry-
onic attempt at creating a democratic foundation in whatever part of Pal-
estine the PNA will be allowed to govern as an independent state. The
likelihood of a healthy birth and productive childhood for independent
13 ALBIE SACHS, THE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA
(1990), cited in Patrick Fitzgerald, Democracy and Civil Society in South Africa: A Re-
sponse to Daryl Glaser, 49 REv. AFRICAN POL. ECON. 94, 108-09 (1990). For a recent
article comparing the negotiation process in each society, see Daniel Lieberfeld, Post-
Handshake Politics: IsraellPalestine and South Africa Compared, 6 MIDDLE E. POL'Y.
131 (1999).
14 A detailed legal history of the South African struggle to end apartheid is beyond the
scope of this Article. For the author's views on this process, see, for example, From Lib-
eration, supra note 1; Communitarianism vs. Individualism: Constitutionalism in Na-
mibia and South Africa, 11 WISC. INT'LL. J. 296 (1993), and citations therein.
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Palestine depends very much on the will of both the Palestinian people
and the international community.
II. INFLUENCES ON DEMOCRATIC STATE BUILDING
While there are many factors that might influence democratization
and constitutionalism in Palestine, this Article will mention seven: the
unipolar world order; economy; education; political pluralization; com-
munitarian/hierarchial society; distrust of authority; and the multilayered
legal regime. These elements provide a backdrop for the discussion of the
constitutional aspects of state building in Parts III and IV.
A. Unipolar World Order
Some Palestinians, including prominent Palestinian-American pro-
fessor Edward Said, have serious complaints about the peace process'5 or
are even completely opposed to negotiating with Israel at all. Many feel
the small discontinuous patches of land that some have called "bantu-
stans''16 or "arabstans" that are being offered in negotiations with Israel
are not worth accepting. Others, such as those in Hamas, call for an Is-
lamic state in all of Biblical Palestine, including present-day Israel. Some
Palestinians desire to get at least the original land grant proposed in U.N.
Security Council Resolution 181 of 1948 for the Palestinian state. 7 This
original land grant is larger than the land transfers being discussed now.
Regardless of one's political perspective, it is important to note that de-
mocracy and constitutionalism in Palestine cannot be viewed in a vac-
uum. Autonomous Palestine has come into existence at a particular his-
torical point in the midst of an existing unipolar world order. The Soviet
Union and its allies are no longer available to assist the Palestinian na-
tional movement militarily, economically, or diplomatically. Absolutist
15 See, e.g., EDWARD SAID, A Cold and Ungenerous Peace, in PEACE AND ITS DISCON-
TENTS: ESSAYS ON PALESTINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 100, 100-06 (1996).
16 See Trudy Rubin, Netanyahu's Leopard-Skin Solution Won't Work, BALTIMORE
SuN, Mar. 21, 1997, at 17A, available in 1997 WL 5503280.
17 See Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: the Bypass Road Network in the West
Bank, 29 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 221, 229 (1997).
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations issued Resolution 181, recommending
the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state with Jerusalem and Beth-
lehem as a separate entity under a special international regime. The partition plan
granted the Jewish population in Palestine just over 56% of the area at a time when
they owned 6.2% of the land and constituted one-third of the total population.
Id. For the original text of Resolution 181, see G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at
131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
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political positions that might have theoretically been implementable at
previous points in history are not possible in the post-Cold War era. Ad-
ditionally, ever since the Gulf War, when the PLO sided with Iraq, Pales-
tinians have not been able to rely on their Arab brother nations for eco-
nomic support as in the past. 8 The United States government, a long-time
ally of Israel over the years, is now the only international political actor
of significance. Any major economic aid for the fledgling Palestine has
to come from the United States, American and other multinational corpo-
rations and banks, or those of European allies.'9 Moreover, the IMF and
the World Bank, both U.S.-dominated, are major players in any redevel-
opment schemes. While the December 1998 visit of American President
Bill Clinton to Palestine was a major diplomatic coup, much of that mu-
tual goodwill was lost when the bombing of Iraq resumed?' President
Arafat's efforts to hinder public demonstrations of support for the Iraqi
people could not conceal the rage and frustration of the Palestinian peo-
ple at a perceived American double standard. For example, Israel has
nuclear and chemical weapons and no one is bombing it.2' Thus the exis-
tence of a unipolar world order has greatly limited the political and con-
stitutional options that autonomous or independent Palestine could under-
take in a wide variety of areas.
B. National Economy
Autonomous Palestine has severe economic problems that affect
democratization efforts as well. The PNA does not control the economic
resources of Palestine. The economy remains dependent on Israel. The
18 For discussion of the Palestinian position since the Gulf War, see Adrien Katherine
Wing, Legal Decision-Making During the Palestinian Intifada: Embryonic Self-rule, 18
YALE J. INT'LL. 95 (1993).
19 For example, the United States pledged $500 million to the West Bank and Gaza
dating from the 1993 Oslo Accords. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PALESTINIAN SELF
RULE AREAS: HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE PALESTINIAN AuTHORITY 41 (Sept. 1997).
2 Two days after President Clinton was cheered during a visit to the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, thousands of Palestinians chanted "Death to Clinton!" and burned U.S. flags
to protest U.S. air strikes against Iraq. See Mohammed Daraghmeh, Palestinian Author-
ity Caught in a Dilemma After U.S. Attack on Iraq, Associated Press, Dec. 17, 1998.
available in 1998 WL 7472513.
21 Most Palestinians strongly identify with the Iraqis as fellow Arabs and fellow Mus-
lims, though their support does not necessarily extend to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.
Arafat has been careful not to hurt his growing ties with the United States, which are
considered an important asset in the quest for Palestinian statehood. However, Arafat
also cannot afford to be seen as opposing the widespread support for Iraq that exists
among his people. Id.
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massive harm and chaos engendered by frequent Israeli border closures is
a deliberate tactic to hurt the Palestinian economy, as is the refusal to
allow the operation of the Gaza airport, to designate bypass roads be-
tween Gaza and the West Bank, and to transfer tax moneys, etc.' More-
over, alleged corruption in the PNA hinders the transfer of promised in-
ternational aid.' Of course, the continued confiscation of Palestinian land
and building of Israeli settlements has profound implications for the Pal-
estinian economy. These factors, combined, help insure that any future
Palestinian state will be very constrained financially.
C. Education
Fortunately, many Palestinians have actively sought out higher edu-
cation and, because of this, they constitute the most highly educated peo-
ple in the Middle East.24 This impressive level of accomplishment will be
an important contributor in the struggle to achieve democracy. The ad-
vanced skill level means that individuals already exist who can staff the
new Palestinian-controlled governmental sector and the various compo-
nents of civil society, such as NGOs, corporations, and schools. Return-
ing exiles have been able to supplement the talents of "insiders," who
may not have had the opportunity to utilize their professional credentials
to the utmost due to the Occupation.
On the negative side, there are large pockets of the Palestinian popu-
lation who have not had sufficient access to education. Since the Israelis
kept the schools closed throughout most of the intifada (1987-94), many
children and young people lost several years of schooling.' The college
population has, of course, been equally affected by their inability to
2 For more information on the current state of the economy, see Oussama Kanaan,
The Peace Process, Uncertainty and Private Investment in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, MIDDLE E. POL'Y, Oct. 1998, at 67; World Bank et al., Palestinian Autonomous
Areas - State of Siege, 9 PALESTINEY. B. INT'LL. 299 (1996-97) (describing the effect of
the Israeli closure policy on the Palestinian economy).
23 An internal audit revealed that PNA corruption and mismanagement wasted ap-
proximately U.S. $326 million, or 40% of the PNA's annual budget. See David P. Fidler,
Foreign Private Investment in Palestine Revisited: An Analysis of the Revised Palestin-
ian Investment Law, 31 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 293, 304 (1999).
2 4 Peter Passell, The Palestinians May Now Have A Chance to Spur Their Economy,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at D2.
2 See, e.g., ANDREW RIGBY, LIVING THE INTIFADA 100, 110 (1991) (discussing the
closure of schools during the intifada years of 1987-90 and the accompanying struggle of
the Palestinian people to compensate, in part, for the education deficiency).
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complete courses of study in a timely manner. This backlog will take
years to rectify.'
Some of the more highly educated have governmental service and
private sector ambitions that cannot be met in the new dispensation. The
creation and training for all the various positions will take some years.
Resentment of the former exiles or perceived favorites of President
Arafat can be considerable.'
To address some of these problems, the PA Ministries of Education
and Higher Education must have the resources to tackle adult and child-
hood illiteracy and vocational and higher-education curricular reform.
Initial training for those newly hired and those continuing professional
training is essential as well. None of this will matter, however, if the
economy does not grow sufficiently to create new jobs.
D. Political Pluralization
Palestinian political pluralization exists to a degree unequalled in the
Arab world. Rather than the Monarch/Dictator/one-party state model, a
full panoply of political factions has existed ranging from Islamic fun-
damentalists to Communists. Like the liberation movements of South
Africa, these Palestinian groups were illegal in the Occupied Territories
prior to the Oslo agreements, and had no time to develop open democ-
ratic structures. There are various PLO factions, including the majority
party Fatah, as well as the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and
the People's Party (former Communist Party).2 During the intifada, an
underground leadership known as the Underground National Leadership
of the Uprising (UNLU) developed.' The Palestine National Council
(PNC) served as a parliament-in-exile for the PLO, containing various
political parties, NGOs, etc. In the future, these entities might have some
impact on democratization in Palestine.
The year 1996 brought with it the first democratic and internation-
ally monitored elections in which a vast majority of the Palestinians
chose among 676 candidates for the PLC and two presidential contend-
ers) Unfortunately, it appears the PNA has been unable or unwilling to
26See generally id.
27 See Interviews, supra note 7.
28 See Wing, supra note 18, at 117.
29 See id. at 116.
30 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 35. "On January 20, 1996, an esti-
mated 75 percent of the electorate turned out to elect, pursuant to the Oslo Accords, a
resident and an eighty-eight member Legislative Council .... Local and international
[Vol. 31:383
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draw upon this heritage. The PLC has accused the PNA and many others
of corruption and brutality against its opponents.31 While PLC members
have boldly criticized the PNA, they have not had the resources to carry
on the democratization process outside of PNA structures. According to
PLC member Professor Ziad Abu Amr, the PLC has been unable to exer-
cise sufficient oversight of the Executive Branch or to enact legislation,
including the Basic Law.' American and Israeli pressure on the PA to
control Hamas terrorism has resulted in the jailing of many members of
Hamas as well as other parties. The detention of prominent critics like
Dr. Iyad Serraj, human rights attorney Raji Sourani, and prominent jour-
nalist Daoud Kuttab has brought international disapproval and indicates
an intolerance for democratic disagreement. If security improves and
the peace process moves forward, it will be interesting to see if the PNA
will be more tolerant of dissident political parties and individuals.
E. CommunitarianlHierarchial Society
Palestine is a communitarian society in which clan and family ties
are central. This communitarian emphasis which is found throughout the
election monitors characterized the election as generally free and fair, with some reserva-
tions." Id.
31 See id. at 28 (reporting accusations of brutality).
32 Ziad Abu-Amr, The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Critical Assessment, 26 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 90 (1997).
33 See HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, supra note 19, at 31.
In February 1995, the PA twice detained Raji Sourani, then-head of the Gaza Cen-
ter for Rights and Law and a prominent lawyer and critic of the PA's human rights
practices. On February 15, Sourani was detained and questioned for about sixteen
hours, after the center published a statement condemning the decree establishing
the state security courts as 'the most serious violation of human rights' since the
inception of self-rule in May 1994.
Id. In another case, Dr. Iyad Sarraj, a medical doctor and former commissioner-general
of the Palestinian Independent Commission on Citizen's Rights, was detained briefly in
December 1995, and accused of "defaming" the Palestinian Authority. He was again
arrested in May 1996, after being quoted in a New York Times editorial as describing the
Palestinian Authority as "corrupt, dictatorial, oppressive," again for "slandering the Pal-
estinian Authority," and detained for eight days. He was re-arrested on June 10, 1996,
this time, purportedly not for his human rights activities. While he was in custody, his
clinic office was searched, and police claimed to have found hashish there. He was
charged with drug possession. After seventeen days in custody, Sarraj was released on
bail after signing a document committing him to "abide by the law when it comes to
publishing anything to do with the authorities." George E. Bisharat, Peace and the Po-
litical Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253, 281
(1999).
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developing world, should not be confused with a communal society
where everyone is equal. This dynamic is also hierarchical, where status
(often inherited) is quite critical.
This communitarian/hierarchical configuration can be an asset for
democratic state building. It may translate into a willingness to adhere to
group party norms rather than merely focusing on individual needs. The
existing party leaders who have acquired or inherited status to some de-
gree, may be obeyed or listened to with a greater degree of loyalty, at
least initially, than is seen in the West. In the Palestinian context, if the
factional and public leaders endorse democratic norms, programs, and
candidates, the populace may follow.
On the other hand, the communitarian/hierarchical factor can be a
major impediment if political leaders endorse or tolerate nondemocratic
or corrupt candidates and programs. There are numerous African exam-
ples where this factor caused friction as ethnic group members blindly
clung to obviously corrupt leaders who engaged in outrageous activities.
An historical lack of emphasis on individual rights may lead people to
suffer in relative silence, punctuated by homicidal outbursts and military
coups to rid the country of one corrupt clique, only to replace it with an-
other.
Palestinian decision makers can build upon the strength of the com-
munitarian heritage by following South Africa's example, designing gov-
erning structures and programs that emphasize this heritage through the
provision of group rights such as respect for language, culture, and edu-
cation. Protecting the individually oriented civil and political rights, such
as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly, is
provided for in the Basic Law as well. Sufficient enforcement mecha-
nisms are essential to provide the foundation for potentially avoiding the
fate of so many dictatorial communitarian societies. Constitutional text
provisions will be discussed in Part III of this Article.
F. Distrust of Authority
Palestinian society has a distrust for governmental authority that has
implications for democratic state building and constitutionalism. The
thirty-year Occupation has naturally made Palestinians distrustful of au-
thority. The intifada was the ultimate attempt to "shake off' an illegiti-
mate regime. 4 This distrust of the former authority can be an asset in the
democratization process since some Palestinians have been overjoyed to
finally embrace a legal, democratically elected Palestinian government.
This passion to be governed finally by one's own people may create a
34 See Wing, supra note 18, at 96.
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level of tolerance with a high enough portion of the population to ensure
political stability in these turbulent transition years.
The negative side is that the distrust of foreign authority has trans-
ferred over to a distrust in any authority. The dynamic of distrust that is
imbedded for one's whole lifetime may be difficult, if not impossible, to
dispel. Children who grew up during the intifada, sometimes called the
Children of the Stones, may constitute a lost generation that is not an-
swerable to anyone. The formation of gangs and religious fundamental-
ism may prove increasingly popular options for this group, with many
unable to transition into "normality." It may be hard for warriors, even
young ones, to lay down their weapons, especially in a struggle as old as
that of the Palestinians.
Palestine will have to engage in a variety of educational and gov-
ernmental programs to build a sense of trust and legitimacy in the young
and old. The conduct of political officials should be above reproach, and
corruption should be rooted out and prosecuted. The lost generation must
be specially targeted to build self-esteem, seek education, and create job
opportunities so that the gang and crime problem does not escalate, as it
has in the United States. There have been piecemeal efforts in the United
States to attempt to reclaim these gang youths. The Amer-I-Can Program
is one such program, founded by former football player, actor, and activ-
ist Jim Brown. It attempts to inculcate specific life skills and values to
assist youth with their future educational or vocational plans. Among the
skills taught are goal setting, problem solving, emotional control, finan-
cial management, effective communication, and family relations?5 Such a
program may have relevance for Palestine.
G. Multilayered Legal Regime
Any efforts at democratization and constitutionalism will be affected
by the extremely convoluted Palestinian legal regime. It is one of the
most complex in the world, partially as a result of numerous occupations.
The legal layers include custom (urf), Islam (shari'a), Ottoman land law,
British Mandate emergency regulations, Israeli civil law for East Jerusa-
lem and Jewish settlers, Jordanian civil law in the West Bank, Egyptian
civil law in Gaza, Israeli military law, changes wrought in all of the
above by the intifada, and legislation and executive edicts passed by the
PNA.
- I am a national consultant for the Amer-I-Can program.
36 For a more detailed discussion of these legal levels, see Wing, supra note 18; see
also SHE-ADER, FROM OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 74-79.
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Custom and customary law occupy a powerful place within Palestin-
ian society. The most ancient legal tradition in Palestine today is the
customary law known as urf (that which is known). Urf handles disputes
outside the official civil or religious courts' on the basis of traditional
oral customs and norms that stress conciliation, mediation, and family
and group honor.' Respected elders or reconciliation committees (ludjnat
el-islah)' or other individuals may mediate disputes until a binding set-
tlement (sulha) is reached. 4' These individuals are always powerful, and
they are always men.41 The parties involved in the dispute may be an in-
dividual claimant, or an entire family or clan (hamula). Offenses against
individuals are also seen as offenses against the family or clan. The types
of disputes include contract issues between businessmen, interfamilial
feuds, trespass and other land matters, and personal injury.43 Settlements
37 See generally Bisharat, supra note 33.
38 Beginning in the British Mandate period after World War I, the customary law often
functioned parallel to, or overlapped with, the civil court system. Similarly, during the
Occupation, "judges in the civil courts generally appear to tolerate the competing sys-
tems sometimes even consciously accommodating it by delaying actions in a case while
awaiting a sulh." GEORGE BISHARAT, PALESTINIAN LAWYERS AND ISRAELI RULE: LAW
AND DISORDER IN THE WEST BANK 42 (1989).
39 See id. at 37.
40 See id. at 32, 187 n.5 (citing "a plethora of anthropological studies that document
the venerated status of mediators in ... Middle Eastern societies"); see also ABNER
COHEN, ARAB BORDER-VILLAGES IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 82 (1965). If a committee was used instead, it had to be neutral
and agreed to by both sides. Its judgment then became binding. The committee members
had to be powerful men in order for their judgments to be obeyed in the community.
They were often supported physically by the hamula or clan. This enabled the disputants
to accept the judgment without losing honor, since it was considered unwise not to ac-
cept the will of powerful men. See id. at 142; see also Ifrah Zilberman, Palestinian Cus-
tomary Law in the Jerusalem Area, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 795 (1996). There are four so-
cial categories of arbitrators; "Manshad"; "Shadad al-Uja"; "Manhi al-Dam"; and
"Qadi." This system of social categories of customary law arbitrators is related to the
degree of risk to the social order that arises from a given dispute. Disputes concerning
family honor are considered the most dangerous. See id. at 801-02.
41 See Bisharat, supra note 33, at 41. Sulh meetings are also described in Subhi Abu-
Ghosh, The Politics of an Arab Village in Israel 130-31 (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Ohio State University Library). This
process of resolving a dispute is known as mediation, even though it might be classified
as arbitration in the Western sense due to its binding nature.
42 See generally Bisharat, supra note 33, at 40 (discussing informal modes of dispute
processing that coexist with the formal system).
43 See generally id. at 39-42 (discussing tribal adjudications and the types of disputes
settled in this form of dispute settlement). Murder occasions a period of vengeance by
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include business closure, exile of family members from the village, and
diya or blood money, which is an amount paid to the victim's family by
the perpetrator's family.' Diya is a pre-Islamic custom that has also been
incorporated into Islamic law' s and is awarded by Palestinian religious
courts as well, indicating another area where custom and religion are
interlinked.4 The settlements are sometimes published in newspapers.'
During the autonomy period, the PNA has expanded its attempts at
control of customary law, regarding it as a major contributor to the future
vitality of Palestinian society.' Custom could be utilized as an asset to
democratization by building upon such principles as respect for authority
and tradition. The polity might obey those in authoritative positions, par-
ticularly if from traditional sources of power or if ruling based upon tra-
ditional principles of justice. Customary law stresses conciliation and
mediation, both of which are processes that may assist the peaceful reso-
lution of disputes within a democratic framework. Thus, customary law
mediation might enhance an overburdened civil law court system. Even
today, "judges in the civil courts generally appear to tolerate the compet-
ing systems, sometimes even consciously accommodating [customary
law] by delaying actions in a case while awaiting a sulh [settlement]." '
The negative aspect of this factor is that blind reliance on traditional
authority is anti-democratic. There needs to be respect for new voices
from nontraditional sources, whether they are women, youth, or others.
Palestinian decision makers must make careful analyses of the role of
custom, decide how to reinforce it where appropriate, and when to obvi-
the victim's family. See id. at 37. Thus, temporary mediators immediately intervene to
obtain a three-and-one-third-day truce called an atweh, prior to the formation of a formal
committee or the selection of a mediator. The truce can be periodically renewed. See id.
at 41.
44 See id. at 40-41; PHILIP J. BALDENSPERGER, THE IMMOVABLE EAST: STUDIES OF THE
PEOPLE AND CUSTOMS OF PALESTINE 117-18 (1913) (providing an early account of blood
dispute); see also Joseph Ginat, Blood Revenge in Bedouin Society, in THE CHANGING
BEDOUIN 59, 68 (Emanuel Marx & Avshalom Shmueli eds., 1984); EMANUEL MARX,
BEDOUINOFTHENEGEV 237 (1967) (describing examples of demands for blood money to
settle).
45 See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALi, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 285
(1991).
46 See ROBERT H. EISENMAN, ISLAMIC LAW IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A HISTORY OF
THE SURVIVAL OF TANZiMAT AND SHARIA IN THE BRITISH MANDATE AND THE JEWISH
STATE 16 (1978).
47 See BISHARAT, supra note 38, at 42.
4s Zilberman, supra note 40, at 810.
49 BISHARAT, supra note 38, at 42.
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ate it. Programs will have to be developed to encourage and train
nontraditional actors to participate. For example, secondary school girls
and boys need exposure to civics. Many women will need to have child
care assistance to allow them to participate in activities outside the pri-
vate sphere. The new customary law mediators might include younger
people and women, in a deviation from traditional practice.
Religion, like custom, is an important component of identity in the
Palestinian community. For Muslims, the shari'a, which is the Islamic
law found in the Koran and other sources, provides rules that govern
daily life.' In Palestine, Islamic law is administered by shari'a courts,
which have decided disputes on matters of personal status (marriage, di-
vorce, child custody, alimony) and inheritance, since the eighteenth cen-
tury." Courts may award diya as well, which is less for injury to a
woman than a man.52 Additionally, urf, as long as it does not contradict
the shari'a is valid for interpreting the Koran. For example, the Koran
'0 See Farhat J. Ziadeb, Permanence and Change in Arab Legal Systems, 9 ARAB
STUD. Q. 20 (1987) (describing the influence of the shari'a on daily life and analyzing
changes in law). For discussion of Islamic law, see generally J.N.D. ANDERSON, ISLAMIC
LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 1-16 (1959); MATTHEw LIPPMAN ET AL., ISLAMIC CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION (1988); Hassan Afchar, The Muslim Concep-
tion of Law, in 2 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. 84 (1975); Chafik Chehata, IslamicLaw,
2 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. 1975, at 138; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Law and Religion
in the Muslim Middle East, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 127 (1987); ISLAM IN TRANSITION: MUS-
LIM PERSPECTIVES (John J. Donohue & John L. Esposito eds., 1982). For a description of
Jordanian religious law, applicable in the West Bank, see Fouad B. Attala, Jordan, in
INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. J-28-J.29 (Victor Knapp ed., 1973); see generally S.H.
AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 244 (1985) (surveying the role of the shari'a in
various Islamic countries).
51 See BISHARAT, supra note 38, at 20. For a concise history of the shari'a courts, see
Lynn Welchman, Family Law Under Occupation: Islamic Law and the Shari'a Courts in
the West Bank, in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 93, 93-115 (Chibli Mallat & Jane Connors eds.,
1990). Prior to the nineteenth century, the only formal courts in Ottoman Palestine were
shari'a courts, located in larger cities and towns, with a chief judge (qadi) in Jerusalem.
In the mid-nineteenth century, reforms known as the Tanzimat, centralized political au-
thority and modernized the state bureaucracy. See BISHARAT, supra note 38, at 19. Civil
courts were established in 1871 to deal with civil and commercial matters while shari'a
courts retained limited jurisdiction. See Anis Kassim, Legal Systems and Developments
in Palestine, I PALESTINE Y.B. INT'LL. 19, 21 (1984). This gradually led to a diminution
of power to the shari'a courts.
52 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-
Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 13, 39 (1990).
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says a man must maintain his wife, but does not specify the amount for
which he is responsible. This is determined by custom. 3
Non-fundamentalist religious elements can be a major asset for de-
mocratization. Palestinian Christian and Muslim leaders and adherents
can all become involved in the secular democratic processes and encour-
age religious and/or moral positions in the legislative process and with
respect to certain programs.
The rise of fundamentalism in the region, as exemplified by the
growth of Hamas in Palestine, presents major challenges for democrati-
zation. Religious law itself can be a hindrance to democratization since it
sanctions the differential treatment of women on the basis of gender. This
difference can immediately come into conflict with constitutional norms
that stress the equality of men and women.
The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 is also a major hindrance to de-
mocratization. These ancient, convoluted policies make it difficult to sort
out who actually owns property, and have been utilized by the Israelis to
confiscate Palestinian land. 4 How will the dispossessed be compensated
for the loss of their land? Adopting a new land law cannot involve
merely placing certain people back on certain lands, since this may over-
compensate the more well-to-do families who previously owned such
land. Similar questions arise when considering the 1948 refugees with
claims to land in Israel and those who have spent decades in refugee
camps.
The Jordanian and Egyptian civil laws pose similar problems to the
Ottoman Land Code. Those rules still in use constitute a hodgepodge of
old standards that are outdated and superseded in their countries of ori-
gin. During the Occupation, the civil courts that implemented these rules
lost whatever legitimacy they once may have had due to inefficiency and
corruption.' A respected independent court system is a vital component
of democracy. Creating vital institutions out of the current rules, institu-
tions, and processes will be a major challenge to be faced.
The British Mandate Emergency Regulations of 1945' and the Is-
raeli military57 laws constitute a special impediment to democratization.
53 See KAMALI, supra note 45, at 284; cf. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAM-
ILY LAW 126-29 (1982) (explaining the use of custom as a source of Islamic law and
providing examples of the role of custom in Islamic law).
54 See the discussion of the Elon Moreh case, in RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER' S LAW 28
(1985) [herinafter SHEHADEH, OccupiER's LAW].
55 See generally BISHARAT, supra note 38, at 211, n.3 (discussing the deterioration of
the formal court system).
56 See generally id. at 21-26 (discussing British Mandate Law); Kassim, supra note 51,
at 23-24; Ylana Miller, Administrative Policy in Rural Palestine: The Impact of British
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Palestinians have been subjected to curfews, expulsions, house demoli-
tions, and a wide variety of other violations of international law." Due to
the Occupation, the Palestinian people have been denied their basic in-
ternational human rights. In numerous books, articles, and international
resolutions, the desire to achieve those rights has been expressed. These
aspirations are an asset to the democratization process because there is a
great desire to create a system in which universal human rights can be
fully implemented. This burning desire has created a certain amount of
good will for the fledgling government.
Unfortunately, some of this good will has dissipated because the
PNA has used undemocratic rules against the populace. As mentioned
previously, many critics of Arafat's actions or the entire peace process
have been rounded up and subjected to torture, imprisonment, etc.59
Another layer of the complex legal regime of Palestine concerns
changes wrought by the intifada, which had some influence on Palestin-
ian society. The occurrence of the intifada could be an asset in the de-
mocratization process due to the shake-up of traditional structures.
Changes have occurred in terms of the legal decision makers, rules, and
processes involved. The intifada represented an embryonic attempt to
gain control over Palestinian society in a broader way than during any
previous period of the Occupation. The skills utilized in this gestational
attempt at self-rule may help in the upcoming period. For example, peo-
ple involved in popular committees, underground leadership, or other
roles may now be able to use their talents in an above-ground manner as
they have become part of the PLC, civil service, or private sector.
The newest legal layer are the laws and edicts of the PNA. President
Arafat has signed fifteen laws in areas such as civil service and foreign
investment. Additionally, he has issued several presidential edicts. There
are a number of laws that remain sitting on his desk, awaiting his signa-
ture, including the Basic Law itself 0
Norms on Arab Community Life 1920-1948, in PALESTINIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS 124
(Joel S. Migdal ed., 1980). While these laws only apply in legally declared states of
emergency, Israel has been in such a state since its 1948 independence. ZE'EV SEGAL,
DEMOKRATIA ISRAELI 152, 158 (1990).
57 See SHEHADAH, OCCUPIER'S LAW, supra note 54, at 28; see generally Bisharat,
Peace, supra note 33, at 47-69 (discussing military law).
58 There is voluminous literature on human rights violations. See, e.g., Falk & Weston,
supra note 12, at 133-37 (see citations therein as well).
59 See Bisharat, supra note 33.
60 President Arafat has endorsed the Civil Service Law No. 96/3 and the Encourage-
ment of Investment Law No. 97/20, and a few other laws in areas such as monetary au-
thority and prisons. Other legislation, such as the Basic Law, Law No. 96/1, and the
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Having concluded a brief survey of the Palestinian multi-layered le-
gal regime, it is evident that any democratizing efforts must take into ac-
count the pre-existing legal system. This task has been simplified since
Birzeit Law Center recently organized a compilation of all the laws in
effect.
It must be noted that there is no existing body of constitutional law
for the West Bank and Gaza, since Palestine has no pre-existing national
constitution. The last constitution for the entire area would be the Pales-
tine Order-in-Council issued in 1922 during the British Mandate period,
which covered what is now Israel as well as what is now Palestine.6 Af-
ter the creation of the State of Israel, Egypt came to administer the Gaza
Strip, but continued to regard the territory as part of Palestine. The Prime
Minister of Egypt issued a Basic Law in 1957, which was superseded
when the President of Egypt issued a new constitution in 1962.62 In the
West Bank, the Jordanian constitution of 1952 governed until the Israeli
Occupation began in 1967.63 This lack of a national constitution could be
an asset in the democratization process since the PLC does not have to
take into account the impact of a prior national constitution. The down
side is that the drafters of new legislation will still have to determine the
impact of the existing complicated legal regime on any new constitu-
tional principles. For example, the Basic Law says there can be no dis-
crimination on the basis of gender." What impact will this have on the
aspects of urf, shari'a, family law, and inheritance law that sanction the
differential treatment of women? These issues will be further discussed
in Part IV of this Article.
The PLC can address these hindrances for democratization in part
through the ongoing use of international experts familiar with the consti-
tutive problems of new nations. For example, the National Democratic
Institute and U.S. Agency for International Development have brought in
foreign experts, as has the PLC itself. In addition to my service for the
PLC, I served as a legal advisor for several years for the African National
Congress Constitutional Committee as it developed a variety of docu-
ments examining its own evolving principles on constitutional issues.
Regulation of Foreign Land Ownership in Palestine, Law No. 97/7, passed by the PLC,
await Presidential endorsement. See Palestinian Legislative Council (visited Apr. 4,
1999) <http://www.pal-plc.org /english/laws/laws. html>.
61 The Order-in-Council had eight parts. Part Two dealt with the Executive Branch,
Part Three with the Legislature, and Part Five with the Judiciary. See SHEHADEH, FROM
OCCUPATION, supra note 1, at 76.
62 See id. at 77.
63 See id. at 78-79.
64 BASIC LAW art. 9.
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They produced several versions of a draft bill of rights and documents for
public consumption such as What is a Constitution? The ANC had the
advantage of several law schools from which to draw expertise and base
its operations. South African constitutional scholars such as Constitu-
tional Court Judge Albie Sachs, Minister of Water Kader Asmal, and
Minister of Justice Dullar Omar have personally informed me that they
are willing to assist the Palestinians, along with U.S.-based scholars such
as John Quigley and Francis Boyle. As noted elsewhere in this issue of
the Journal, Palestinian-American scholar George Bisharat has been as-
sisting with judicial reform as has Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Professor Hiram Chodosh.66 There should be a variety of
efforts to increase input from the general public as well.
Studies must be undertaken by the PLC and others to determine
which laws need to be revoked or amended and which new laws, includ-
ing constitutional ones, need to be implemented, in order to unify the le-
gal system in a democratic fashion. The potential impact of all these
changes needs to be carefully assessed. Many have called for the publica-
tion of a Palestinian Official Gazette to disseminate all laws and regula-
tions. 6
Now that all seven influences on democratic state building have
been preliminarily discussed, it is possible to center the analysis on the
constitutional process and the actual strengths and weaknesses of the tex-
tual provisions of the Basic Law.
Ill. CONSTTUTIONAL TEXTUAL PROVISIONS
A. Constitutional Process
Before discussing selected strengths and weaknesses of the Basic
Law, I will briefly focus on the process leading up to its finalization by
the PLC. I detail this process here because I have not seen it accurately
described in the literature. Moreover, I was involved to such an extent
that I have personal knowledge of the accuracy discussed here. Addition-
ally, the process gives insight into the embryonic democratic potential in
Palestine.
65 Professor Hiram Chodosh was a principal participant in a comprehensive 1995-97
study recommending recodification and harmonization of all the pre-existing legal layers
in Palestine. See generally Hiram E. Chodosh & Stephen A. Mayo, The Palestinian Le-
gal Study: Consensus and Assessment of the New Palestinian Legal System, 38 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 375 (1997).
66 See Interviews, supra note 7.
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In December 1993, the PLO published a draft of a Basic Law, pro-
posed by Dr. Anis Kassim as head of the four-member Higher Legal
Commission appointed by PLO Chairman Arafat. With input from some
Palestinian jurists and scholars, as well as women's activists and others,
a third version was published in April 1994.' This document was super-
seded by a fourth draft, which was submitted to the newly elected PLC in
May 1996. The PLC turned the fourth draft over to the new PLC Legal
Committee, which considered it along with a fifth draft that had been
produced by the Birzeit Law Center. The fifth draft contained a heavy
emphasis on international legal norms. The committee drafters were very
concerned with developing a highly democratic document, one that
would benefit from the experiences of other countries, including South
Africa, all the Arab countries, and the United States.6 They wanted a
document that would be more fully detailed than the American constitu-
tion, but not as detailed as the one-hundred-page South African docu-
ment. They wanted to take account of international law norms, but pro-
duce a document that would have meaning and effect within the Palestin-
ian context. The Legal Committee thus produced a sixth draft that was
published and circulated in Palestine and abroad for comment. While the
sixth draft was being prepared for circulation, the Executive Branch
submitted a seventh draft produced independently to the PLC as well.
After a period of public commentary, The Legal Committee produced an
eighth draft for initial consideration by the full PLC.
The PLC deliberated during the months of August and September
1996, and produced a ninth draft, also known as the First Reading. This
version was sent over to the Executive branch for its consideration. After
months without a response, the PLC completed a revision known as the
Second Reading, followed by a final round of revisions resulting in the
Third Reading in October 1997. This final version remains on President
Arafat's desk.
The Basic Law represents several years of input from a wide variety
of constituencies. It was not dictated by any individual or small cadre of
individuals. I have consulted with numerous prominent Palestinians, in-
cluding members of the PLC, about the likelihood of the President's sig-
nature to the Basic Law. One person indicated that President Arafat had
told him that he will never sign the Basic Law, "even after I am dead." 9 I
67 See Naseer H. Aruri & John J. Carroll, A New Palestine Charter, J. PALESTINE
STUD., Summer 1994, at 5.
6 The author was involved at this point in the process.
69 This person needs to remain anonymous since critics of the PNA and Arafat have
ended up in prison or worse. According to Professor Fidler, Arafat's failure to sign the
Basic Law may also be related to the lack of progress in the peace process and the anom-
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was told the principal reason for his refusal to sign is that the Basic Law
establishes checks and balances that would fill the constitutional vacuum
and end the legal possibility of governance by executive fiat supported
by the British Emergency Laws.
The remainder of this section focuses on textual provisions, both
those present and those lacking in the Basic Law. I will refer to the South
African constitutional process throughout this part.
B. Textual Provisions
1. Parliament as Constitutional Assembly
One of the most important outcomes of the South African constitu-
tional process was the decision to create a popularly elected parliament
that would also serve as a constitutional assembly to draft a permanent
constitution by the third year of the interim period. 0 The Palestinian Ba-
sic Law should likewise provide that the PLC serve as a constitutional
assembly to write the permanent governing document. Since the Basic
Law has not yet been adopted, and the interim period is nearly over, the
PLC could use the Basic Law as a base line in redrafting a constitution of
independence. Sufficient time should also be allocated for comments by
the public, expert scholars, and the like.
2. Supremacy of the Constitution
The South African constitution specifically states that it is the su-
preme law of the land, and that any law or conduct which is inconsistent
with its provisions is invalid. 7' This supremacy clause was considered
essential for a society in which statutes wielded by evil men had been the
reality of the abuse of power. It also was important due to the tension
between the new democratic norms and the inegalitarian structures exis-
tent in all the previous legal layers, especially in customary law.
Palestine faces a similar situation in terms of the need to validate
democratic state building and constitutionalism. The Basic Law, how-
ever, has no supremacy clause. Article 6 states that all authorities are
subject to the law. It does not, however, make it clear that all law should
aly of enacting a constitution when the PNA does not even control its own borders. See
Fidler, supra note 23, at 306.
70 SeeS. ArR. CONST. (Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993) §§ 68, 73, reprinted in
BIRTH OF A CONSTITUTION 329, 343-45 (Bertus de Villiers ed., 1994) [hereinafter 1993
Interim Constitution].
71 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 2.
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be subject to the constitution.' This is critical for the same reasons as it
was in South Africa. The existing legal layers were inegalitarian and
there was no history of democratic leadership.
3. Separation of Powers
The South African constitution has an elaborate system of checks
and balances to help ensure that the rule of law will eventually supplant
the rule of men. For instance, the South African President can be im-
peached by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly for serious
misconduct, or he can be removed by a vote of no confidence by a major-
ity of the Assembly. 3
The Basic Law does not provide for a method to remove the Presi-
dent. He remains in office for the interim period, no matter how long that
is. While this was understandable in the autonomy period with its nebu-
lous dimensions and dependence upon the personality of Yasser Arafat,
this must be changed in the independence constitution. Since the Presi-
dent is popularly elected in Palestine, he should probably be removable
by some supermajority of the legislature as is the case in the United
States. The President should also be restricted in the number of terms he
may serve, perhaps limiting them to two four or five-year terms. There
are too many examples in the Middle East of presidents for life, de jure
or de facto.
4. Judicial Review and a Constitutional Court
Article 98 of the South African interim constitution established for
the first time a constitutional court appointed by the President having the
power of judicial review.74 The creation of this court, separate from the
72 See BAsic LAw art. 6.
73 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1993) §§ 89, 102.
74 For a discussion of these options, see Adrien Wing et al., Judicial Review for Pales-
tine (visited Mar. 5, 1999) <http://lawcenter.birzeit.edu/lawc98d/Publications/WING2b.
html>; see generally Ziyad Motala, Independence of the Judiciary, Prospects and
Limitations of Judicial Review in Terms of the United States Model in a South African
Order: Towards an Alternative Judicial Structure, 55 ALB. L. REV. 367, 397 (1991)
(noting South Africa's institution of the United States' model of judicial review into its
legal ecosystem). For a review of the shortcomings of judicial review, see Penuell M.
Maduna, Judicial Review and Protection of Human Rights Under a New Constitutional
Order in South Africa, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 73, 78-81, (1989).
Nelson Mandela has stated: "For South Africa, the idea of a Constitutional Court is
quite revolutionary .... The issue of whether we need 'or want' a constitutional
court.., presupposes the acceptance of constitutionalism. Without constitutionalism, we
will not need a constitutional court." See generally Nicholas Haysom, Democracy, Con-
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predominantly white regular judiciary, 75 was a priority of the ANC. A
broad-based judicial services commission was also created to recommend
appointees to the bench. 76 These bodies can play an important role in pre-
venting judicial abuse.
Palestine should strongly consider establishing similar bodies, espe-
cially given its regional context. In most Middle Eastern countries, the
judiciary is subservient to the regime in power. Although the laws on the
books may appear liberal, the effectiveness of the judiciary tends to be a
function of the political style of the ruling party, regardless of whether
they are based on the shari'a or on secular principles. The judiciary is
rarely able to contradict the policies of the executive branch or to tran-
scend the limited role assigned to it by the political authorities. Palestini-
ans will need to adopt safeguards to avoid reproducing these problems.
Like the apartheid-era judiciary, the Israeli-appointed judiciary that
served in the Palestinian civil courts lost whatever legitimacy it may once
have had.' The PNA, like the new South African government, faces the
task of restoring the legitimacy of the judiciary. Judges need to be re-
garded as impartial and competent, rather than as political cronies loyal
to the ruling faction. To this end, the Basic Law provides for an ap-
pointed judiciary with guarantees of independence and tenure.' A High
Constitutional Court will also be formed. 9 These measures will do much
to enhance the credibility of the judiciary. Currently, the Executive
branch dismisses judges who disagree with it.'
stitutionalism and the ANC's Bill of Rights for a New South Africa, 18 Soc. JUST. 47
(Spring-Summer 1991).
75 The regular judiciary contained only one Indian and no black judges. At the time the
interim constitution was drafted, only three black senior advocates were even qualified
for the bench. See Johann van der Vyver, Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid
South Africa, 40 EMORY L. J. 745, 802 (1991).
76 See 1993 Interim Constitution, supra note 70, § 105.
77For more on the Palestinian judiciary, see Bisharat, supra note 33. For more about
the impact of the Israeli occupation on judicial autonomy in Palestine, see John Quigley,
Judicial Autonomy in Palestine: Problems and Prospects, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 697,
706-07 (1996).
78 BASIC LAW arts. 88, 89, 90.
79 See id. art. 94.
8o President Arafat "retired" the Chief Judge Amin Abd al-Salam. He presided over the
release of Birzeit University students, whom the High Court ruled were illegally detained
in March 1996. See Amnesty International, Human Rights in the Autonomous Areas, in 9
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'LL. 327, 348 (1996/97).
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5. A Competent Civil Service
South Africa inherited a civil service that had assisted in the imple-
mentation of apartheid for forty years and had incorporated blacks in
only the most menial positions. The interim constitution provided for a
Public Service Commission to ensure the development of an efficient,
non-partisan bureaucracy that makes services and job opportunities
available to all citizens regardless of race."' The Basic Law should adopt
a similar approach in order to avoid the civil service becoming filled with
party loyalists lacking appropriate qualifications. The Palestinian situa-
tion is complicated by the fact that there is an abundance of qualified in-
dividuals for the relatively few skilled positions in the civil service. Only
an absolute meritocracy in the hiring, retention, and promotion of civil
service employees can dampen the frustrations of those denied jobs in the
bureaucracy. A constitutional mandate for egalitarianism in the civil ser-
vice would be a useful measure to this end. The current provision in the
Basic Law merely states that "matters of the civil service shall be regu-
lated by law."' This wording is entirely too vague to prevent possible
future cronyism and corruption.
6. Protecting the Public
South Africa under apartheid, like the rest of Africa, was not im-
mune to governmental abuses of power which threatened the safety of the
public. Chapter Nine of the South African constitution, therefore, estab-
lished several government agencies to safeguard the public interest. 3 The
Public Protector is a type of ombudsman whose duty it is to investigate
government corruptionY1 This appointed official can act with or without a
complaint. The Human Rights Commission is empowered to investigate
complaints of human rights violations and issue recommendations to the
government.' Recognizing the special conditions confronting women,
the constitution-drafters included a Commission for Gender Equality
which can make recommendations concerning legislation.' A Commis-
sion on Restitution of Land Rights was established to address the legacy
of the forcible dispossession of blacks from their landsY This body can
81 See 1993 Interim Constitution, supra note 70, ch. 13.
v BASic LAW art. 78.
83 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) ch. 9.
84See id. § 182.
8 See id. § 184.
8 See id. § 187.
87 See 1993 Interim Constitution, supra note 70, §§ 121, 122.
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investigate claims, draw up court reports, and mediate disputes. There is
also a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of
Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities which addresses the
interests of these groups.'
Since Palestine also has a history of government corruption, human
rights violations, gender discrimination, and land confiscation, the PLC
would do well to constitutionally empower agencies to address these is-
sues. If such problems are ignored or if responsibility for them is as-
signed to existing PLO bureaucracies, the status quo is likely to continue.
The appointive nature of such commissions must be carefully scrutinized
to ensure that they are not controlled by supporters of the status quo.
7. Enshrining Constitutional Principles
Fear and distrust among the South African parties led them to agree
upon a set of preliminary principles as a first step in the process of nego-
tiating the transfer of power. These principles could not be changed by
the interim parliament or derogated from in the permanent constitution.
The Constitutional Court had the power to reject any proposed legislation
that was inconsistent with them. Among the principles agreed upon were
a multiparty system, equality of opportunity, and a trilateral separation of
powers.'
There is similar distrust between Palestinians and Israelis as well as
among the various Palestinian factions. A set of constitutional principles
would be a useful instrument in building consensus at an early stage in
the permanent constitutional process. Agreement on the concept of secu-
lar multiparty democracy would, for example, assuage certain doubts.
Islamic fundamentalists, however, might not accept the idea without
guarantees of minority-party protections. The constitutional principles
could then bind the Constitutional Assembly/PLC as it redrafts the Basic
Law and transforms it into the independence constitution.
8. Repealing Laws
Schedule seven of both the interim and permanent South African
constitutions list a number of laws that were repealed simultaneous to the
passage of the constitution. These provisions in the interim constitution
abolished most of the de jure legacy of apartheid.
88 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 185.
89 A full list of the principles is found in the 1993 Interim Constitution, supra note 70,
sched. 4.
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Moreover, the South African constitution only permits a State of
Emergency to be called under very limited circumstances. 90 The Basic
Law also contains provisions about the declaration of a State of Emer-
gency. The President can decree such a state "during the existence of a
threat to national security as a result of war, invasion, armed revolt, or
the occurrence of a natural disaster."9' He can initially declare a State of
Emergency for thirty days, with the possibility of an additional thirty-day
extension, if approved by a two-thirds vote in the PLC.' The PLC feared
that it might be suspended during such an emergency, so it provided that
it could not be removed or impeded during the period.93 Most impor-
tantly, the Basic Law abolishes all provisions regulating states of emer-
gency, including the British regulations.94 Another advantage of such a
repeal is that it requires a comprehensive review of the multilayered legal
regime in force in Palestine. These laws must be systematically evaluated
and replaced over a period of many years, but repeal of some of the most
egregious laws in the constitution would signal the centrality of this task.
9. Protecting Human Rights
The South African constitution provides basic civil and political
rights to all South Africans. It guarantees such rights as freedom and se-
curity of the person,95 freedom of religion, belief, and opinion,' expres-
sion,97 assembly, demonstration and petition,' association,' movement
and residence,'1° political rights to form parties,' °' and criminal proce-
dural rights."° There are also specific rights to life and human dig-
90 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1998) § 37 (limiting declaration of a State of Emer-
gency to when the "life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection,
disorder, natural disaster, or other public emergency [where] the declaration is necessary
to restore peace and order").
91 BASIc LAW art. 101.
97 See id.
93 See id. art. 104.
94 See id. art. 105.
95 See generally S. AR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 12.
96 See id. § 15.
97 See id. § 16.
9' See id. § 17.
99 See id. § 18.
'e See S. AR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 21.
'o' See id. § 19.
,2 See id. § 35.
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nity,'" while servitude and forced labor are banned." To allay white
fears of socialism, there are specific guarantees concerning private prop-
erty. 1
The constitution also provides for some economic, social, and cul-
tural rights, including the right to a healthy environment,0 7 housing,1°8 a
language and culture,"° education," 0 and the right to basic nutrition,
health, and social services."' Children's rights are specifically delineated
as well." 2 Economic, social, and cultural rights are not absolute. The
ANC realized that the new government would not have the resources to
guarantee these costly entitlements. With respect to the rights to housing,
health care, food, water, and social security, the government's responsi-
bility is limited. "The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive reali-
sation [sp] of each of these rights."".3
The equality clause deserves special mention because its protections
are much broader than those found in the U.S. Constitution. The clause
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of "race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, dis-
ability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.""..4 It also
permits affirmative-action initiatives based on these categories."5
Most of the rights can be limited if a five-part test is met which in-
cludes an analysis of numerous factors such as the nature of the right,
importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the
limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and the
less-restrictive means to achieve the purpose."6 Certain rights can not be
derogated from, even in a State of Emergency, and a table is provided
103 See id. § 11.
'o, See id. § 10.
1o5 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 13.
"o See id. § 25.
107 See id. § 24.
108 See id. § 26.
'09 See id. §§ 30, 31.
"o See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 29.
"' See id. § 27.
112 See id. § 28.
" See id. § 27(2).
"14 See id. § 9(3).
"5 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 9(2).
116 See id. § 36.
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listing those norms."7 The Bill of Rights must be interpreted taking into
account international law, and the judges may consider foreign law as
well. 1
The attentiveness of the South African constitution to human rights
concerns makes it an apt model for Palestine where human rights have
long been an issue. The South African experience also demonstrates that
it is possible to approve a constitution that is more progressive in its legal
provisions than prevailing cultural norms. For example, none of the tradi-
tional cultures of South Africa, whether they are Black, Coloured, or
White, approve of homosexuality, yet the equality clause covers homo-
sexuals, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals. Of course,
protection for homosexuals is not likely to be granted in the Palestinian
Basic Law at this time.
The Basic Law also provides for these various human rights. Article
10 makes clear that "human rights and basic freedoms are necessary and
an obligation of respect."" 9 It goes even further by proclaiming that the
PNA "works without delay to incorporate international and national dec-
larations and agreements which protect human rights.""2 Therefore, even
though Palestine is not a state and may not become a state, the PLC was
agreeable to binding itself to international law. Some earlier versions of
the Basic Law listed all the relevant conventions, but these were elimi-
nated due to the unwieldy size. 2' The Basic Law calls for an independent
human rights body that reports to the President and the PLC. In Septem-
ber 1993, Chairman Arafat created the Palestinian Independent Commis-
sion for Citizen's Rights to serve this purpose. It has already produced
reports for the PLC critical of the PNA.11
With respect to civil and political rights, one of the most progressive
clauses is the equality clause, the first one in the section on human rights,
states that "Palestinians are equal before the law and the judiciary. There
is no discrimination between them because of descent, gender, color, re-
117 See id. § 37(5)(c).
"s See id. § 39.
119 BASIC LAW art 10.
"' Id. art. 10.
121 The Author participated in these discussions.
122 See BASIC LAW art. 31. The Palestinian Independent Commission on Citizens'
Rights, established by Decree, is a quasi-governmental board charged with monitoring
the performance of the Palestinian Authority, and particularly with ensuring the compli-
ance of public institutions with human rights principles. Bisharat, supra note 33, at 262
(referring to Decree Number 59 of 1993). The Decree was published in the Official Ga-
zette and became effective only in 1995. Id at n. 37.
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ligion, political opinion or disability."'" I will discuss the gender impli-
cations of Article 9 in the next section of this Article.
One of the significant tensions in the Basic Law involves criminal
procedural rights. The framers did not want to be so detailed as to effec-
tively draft a new criminal procedure code. On the other hand, they did
not want to create a vacuum in which the Executive branch could easily
trample on citizens' rights. Such a concern was particularly justified for
Palestinians, who lived under Occupation for thirty years subject to laws
which denied criminal due process rights. Unfortunately, the drafting in
these provisions is sufficiently vague as to permit future executive viola-
tions. For example, Article 1 1 states "[i]t is not permitted to arrest some-
one, search him, imprison him, restrict his freedom through any restric-
tion or forbid his movement except through judicial order in accordance
with the provisions of the law. The law limits the period of precautionary
imprisonment."'24 Recent (albeit well-meaning) practice by the Executive
indicates that, emergency laws (or no laws) can result in many people
being arrested and detained in violation of normal due process provi-
sions. It might be better to follow the South African example and delimit
all the fundamental rights that cannot be abrogated even in a state of
emergency. 121
The Basic Law does provide for personal freedom,"z and that all
those arrested shall be informed of the reasons. "They may contact a
lawyer and apply to trial without delay."'27 Unfortunately, this does not
mean that a state-appointed lawyer will be provided. In a society where
so many are poor or unemployed, this type of provision must be in-
cluded. Another section confirms that "everyone accused of a crime must
have a lawyer to defend him."' Once again, it does not say the state will
pay. Another important criminal right is that "[no one may be subject to
any compulsion or torture . . . any statement or confession procured in
contradiction with the first subsection of this article shall be deemed
void."' This provision is especially important since so many Palestini-
ans have been tortured in Israeli prisons and the Israeli High Court has
123 BASIC LAW art. 9.
124 Id. art. 11.
125 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 37(5)(c).
126 BASIC LAW art. 11.
127 Id. art. 12.
' Id. art. 14.
' Id. art. 13.
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even confirmed that torture is acceptable.'" Unfortunately, it appears that
the PNA is replicating its Israeli predecessors by continuing to subject
many Palestinians to torture."' Article 14 reaffirms the principle that the
"accused is innocent until proven guilty in a legal trial which guarantees
him all assurances to defend himself.' ' 32 The problem, however, is that
the PNA has created state security courts that hold their sessions in the
darkness, constituting a form of kangaroo court. In one case, two mem-
bers of the security forces who were found guilty of homicide, were tried,
and executed in just two days.
The provision that collective punishment is forbidden is quite impor-
tant given the use of this illegal technique by the Israelis during the Oc-
130 On Sunday January 11, 1999, in an exceptional hearing with a panel of nine judges,
the Israeli High Court again postponed its decision to ban the use of torture in Israeli
prisons. The nine-judge panel, in a 5-4 vote refused to give a temporary injunction
against the use of torture during the ongoing interrogation of two Palestinian suspects
and decided to rule later on the general use of torture. In the dissent, Chief Justice Barak
wanted to issue a temporary injunction against the use of torture. See THE PALESTINIAN
SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, ANNUAL Hu-
MAN RIGHTS REPORT (1998).
131 See Amnesty International, supra note 80, at 340.
Amnesty International... has received substantive and ... consistent testimonies
alleging torture by most branches of the Palestinian security forces. Torture ap-
pears now to be most widespread in Gaza. Mahmud Jumayel, who died on 31 July
1996 after being tortured in Jneid Prison, Nablus, on 27 July, was tortured by the
use of electric elements, whilst being suspended and beaten.
Id. On August 16, 1998, two citizens, Abdallah al-Jabarine, 41, and WassefAyayda, 31,
were detained at the Hebron detention centre by Preventive Security and Force 17
agents. During their interrogation, they were made to suffer various forms of torture
including skull-hair removal, severe beating, sleep deprivation, and hooding. A video
tape of al-Jabarine after his release showed bruising all over his body. See THEPALESTIN-
IAN SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note
130.
1' BASIC LAW art. 14.
133 In a court case set up with unprecedented haste, the Palestinian Authority issued
death sentences against the two brothers, Fares and Raed Abu Sultan. Two days later,
President Arafat approved the sentence and the two brothers were executed. On August
30, 1998, President Yasser Arafat approved and signed a military court order for the
execution of three brothers from Gaza; Mohammad, Fares, and Raed Abu Sultan. The
three had been charged with the first degree murder of the two Al Khalidi brothers. The
execution took place on the same day. Fares Abu Sultan's death sentence was reduced to
life imprisonment. See generally PALESTINIAN SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE ENvIRONMENT, supra note 130.
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cupation. "For example: if a boy throws a stone at a soldier, the response
may be to blow up the boy's house, or place a curfew on the entire vil-
lage. Homes cannot be searched without a warrant." This is a significant
right for a people used to having Israeli soldiers break down their doors
and haul away family members, while destroying the house in the mean-
time.
The Palestinians are a people with a Muslim majority, a Christian
minority, and even a few Jewish Samaritans. The Basic Law guarantees
freedom of belief and worship.'1 A potential source of conflict exists,
however, in the text. Article 4 indicates that "Islam is the official religion
of Palestine."137 What does this clause mean? Apparently, most Arab
countries have included it in their constitutions; I was present when it
was added to the text, even though previous versions said nothing on the
subject. Each country has determined its meaning in their specific cul-
tural context. At the same time, Article 4 guarantees the practice of
monotheistic religions.'38 Freedom of religion is not absolute and exists
on the condition that "they do not interfere with public order or public
morals."" Currently, this may not be problematic since the PNA is secu-
lar in character. If, however, a more fundamentalist faction came to
power, this clause might be used to force women to veil, as occurred dur-
ing the 1989 hijab campaign in Gaza during the intifada.'4
Article 19 states "there shall be no interference with freedom of
opinion. Every person has the right to express his opinion and spread it
though speech, writing or through other methods of expression or art,
with the supervision of the provisions of the law."'' The caveat in the
second sentence can clearly undermine the grant of freedom in the first
sentence. Many Palestinians went to prison during the Occupation for
expressing views favorable to the PLO. Now, many Palestinians have
been arrested for disagreeing with the PNA, much less openly siding with
Hamas. Draconian laws such as the British Emergency laws, if passed in
the future, will undermine the fledgling democracy - presuming the fur-
134 See BASIC LAW art. 15.
'" See id. art. 17.
'36 See id. art. 18.
'37 Id. art. 4.
13' Id.
139 See BASIC LAW art. 18.
140 See Rema Hammami, Women, the Hijab and the Intifada, MIDDLE E. REP., May-
Aug. 1990, at 24; Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion and Rights: The Future
Legal Status of Palestinian Women, 35 HARV. INT'LL. J. 149, 190 (1994).
141 BASic LAW art. 19.
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therance of democracy is indeed the goal. What can freedom of opinion
mean under such conditions at all? Clearly such a right has no meaning
in conditions of violence and fear. It can only have meaning in conditions
of peace.
The Basic Law also guarantees freedom of residency and movement
"in the limits of the law."'" All of these provisos limiting the rights could
be looked at as stating the obvious - any right exists only as guaranteed
by law. On the other hand, such specific language may be viewed as an
opportunity to lay down limits in future legislation. Freedom of move-
ment was denied to Palestinians during the Occupation, and it is under-
standable why they would want it. The bifurcated nature of their territory
with Israel in the middle, controlling all entry and exit points, such free-
dom has no meaning. The safe passage called for in the Oslo Accords
still does not exist between the West Bank and Gaza. 3 Israel frequently
closes the Gaza Crossing into Israel, making Gaza a virtual prison. The
new Gaza Airport, opened with great fanfare, has already been shut down
by the Israelis. People living in the West Bank and Gaza cannot go to
East Jerusalem, not even to pray at the A1-Aqsa Mosque, the third most
holy shrine in Islam. At certain times, Israel has even shut down passage
between towns within the West Bank.'" Thus this right can have no
meaning without the international cooperation of Israel. Moreover, Arti-
cle 28 states that Palestinians cannot be exiled from their land." This
right also has special significance since several thousand Palestinians
were deported during the Occupation and many Palestinians living in the
diaspora are not permitted to visit." Israel, not the PNA, controls the
borders.
The Basic Law also delineates certain political rights, including the
right to form political parties, unions, etc." Freedom of the press and
other means of communication is guaranteed "in accordance with this
Basic Law and other related laws."'" Once again, however, the language
can permit massive intrusion into press freedoms. This right is particu-
' Id. art. 20.
143Oslo II, art. 29 governs safe passage. SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION, supra note 1,
at 227.
14For examples of the closures, see Human Rights Watch, Israeli Closure of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, reprinted in 9 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 305 (1996-97).
14' BAsIc LAW art. 28.
'"6Numerous Palestinian Americans have confided in the Author that they were un-
able to enter Israel, despite a valid American passport.
147 BASIC LAW art. 26.
'4' Id. art. 27.
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larly important given the history of denial during the Occupation. The
arrests of journalists by the PNA have resulted in self-censure by most of
the Palestinian press. The editor of one paper was arrested for failing to
put a story on page one instead of page eight. Another journalist was ar-
rested for broadcasting the public sessions of the PLC." This is a right
that, practically speaking, has not been implemented, and it must be.
One interesting right from an American perspective is the right to
litigation as found in Article 30 of the Basic Law. This right ensures that
people can use the courts and seek compensation. 110 During the Occupa-
tion, Palestinians could not use the law to seek justice, so this new right
emerges as significant.
Like South Africans, Palestinians are very concerned with private
property rights. Israel confiscated large areas of the West Bank and Gaza,
depriving many Palestinians of property that had been in their family for
generations. 5' Article 21 of the Basic Law makes clear that "private
property is protected. Expropriation or acquisition of real or moveable
property shall not be completed except for public benefit in accordance
with the law and with the presentation of just compensation or mandated
by judicial ruling."' 2 This article also makes it clear that the economic
system is a free market, and that "freedom of economic activity is guar-
anteed.' 15 3 Once again, during the Occupation, farms were confiscated or
disrupted and businesses were shut down or closed. During the autonomy
period, frequent Israeli border closures have had a severe impact on the
Palestinian economy. 5 4
149 HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, supra note 19, at 25.
[O]n December 24, 1995, Maher Alameh, an editor of the newspaper al-Quds, re-
ceived a phone call at midnight, telling him to move an article about Chairman
Arafat's meeting with the Greek Orthodox Patriarch from page eight to page one
of the Christmas day issue. Alameh refused and was subsequently detained in Jeri-
cho for five days by the PSS.
Id.
150 See BASIC LAW art. 30.
151 See generally SHEHADEH, OCCuPIER's LAW, supra note 54, at 28.
152 BASIC LAW art. 21.
153 Id.
154 The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories
(UNSCO) reported that Palestinian real gross national product (GNP) has declined by
18.4% between end-1992 and end-1996, which is mainly attributable to the loss of em-
ployment in Israel and the decline in trade flows due to the Israeli closure policy. UN-
SCO also reports that the Israeli closure policy, combined with significant population
growth, has caused real per capita GNP to fall 36.1% between 1992 and 1996. In addi-
tion, UNSCO calculates that closures have cost the Palestinian economy approximately
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The PLC might consider following some of the South African ex-
amples regarding economic, social, and cultural rights. Article 23 of the
Basic Law states that "convenient housing is a right for every citizen.
The National Authority shall endeavor to insure housing to whomever
does not have a dwelling."'55 While the "shall endeavor" language is po-
tentially limiting, the "progressive realisation" language in the South Af-
rican constitution is more precise. Similarly, Article 25 of the Basic Law
states "work is a right for every citizen." Going far beyond Article 23,
Article 25 then goes on to state, "[ilt is an obligation and honor and the
National Authority endeavors to provide it for all those who are able."'"
The PNA does not have the resources to undertake this type of well-
meaning obligation at this time.
Article 22 regarding social security is much more limited. It does
not promise a right to social security. "The law shall regulate social secu-
rity and health insurance services for citizens and provisions for incapac-
ity and old age."'57 The only people guaranteed social security, health
insurance, and educational services are "the families of martyrs, prison-
ers .... wounded, injured, and disabled."'5
The language of obligation is much more precise with respect to
education. "Education is a right of every citizen and compulsory at least
until the end of the formative stages." '59 Of course, it is deliberately un-
clear what the end of the formative stages means --kindergarten, elemen-
tary, junior high school, or high school? Another aspect of this article is
quite important as it guarantees independence of universities. This right
could be very important since the PNA has sent troops onto campuses,
arrested students for protesting, and even arrested a professor who in-
eluded comments critical of the PNA in his exam."'°
$6.5 billion for the 1993-1996 period, or a $4.4 million loss per day. See David P. Fidler,
Peace Through Trade? Developments in Palestinian Trade Law During The Peace Proc-
ess, 38 VA. J. INT'LL. 155, 163, 164 (1998).
155 BAsIC LAW art. 23.
"4 Id. art. 25.
'57 Id. art. 22.
1 Id.
9 Id. art 24.
160 See Charles Robert Davidson, The Challenge to Democratization: Arafat and the
New Elite, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 171, 181 (1999) (citations omitted).
In March 1996, Palestinian police raided and dispersed an opposition rally at al-
Najah University in Nablus, arresting several students in the process. The follow-
ing month, thousands of university students attempted to hold a rally at Bir Zeit
University, but were impeded by security services who ordered the buses not to
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There is even a provision relating to motherhood and children's
rights. Article 29 makes clear that children must be protected from harm
or cruel treatment, and that they must be imprisoned separately from
adults. "' This right has critical significance since children have not been
immune from maltreatment by the police or military.
The PLC should also consider following the example of the South
Africans with respect to environmental rights. Article 33 of the Basic
Law restores a section that had been deleted from the First Reading. The
current provision is too brief, however, stating "[a] balanced, clean envi-
ronment is one of the human rights. Preservation and protection of the
Palestinian environment for present and future generations is a national
responsibility."'62 According to Article 24 of the South African constitu-
tion:
everyone has the right -
to an environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being;
and
to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that-
prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
promote conservation; and
secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural re-
sources while promoting justifiable economic and social develop-
ment.1
The South African government has limited its obligation through the use
of the term "reasonable," and Palestine could do the same.
transport the students to the university. When the students marched to police head-
quarters, police shot into the air in an attempt to disperse the gathered crowd.
Id.
161 BASIC LAW art. 29.
162 Id. art. 33.
163 S. AFR. CONST. § 24. For a more elaborate proposal on environmental sights for the
Basic Law, see Kevin C. Papp, Environmental Constitutional Protection, Human Rights
and the Eighth Draft of the Temporary Constitution for the Palestinian National Author-
ity in the Transitional Period, 7 IoWA J. TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 529, 561-
75 (1997).
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IV. CASE STUDY: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND CONSTrrUTIoNAL REFORM
Women's rights is one area in which the provision of human rights
for all will be difficult to implement. Since women have historically suf-
fered unequal treatment under civil law and custom, constitutional at-
tempts to improve their position face special challenges. The South Afri-
can constitution's stated commitment to gender equality is definitely
worth considering for Palestine.
A. Women's Rights in South Africa164
Black women in South Africa still face a double burden of discrimi-
nation: as a black person under the apartheid legacy and as a woman in a
patriarchal society." Constituting more than thirty-six percent of the
population," they remain the most oppressed group in the country. 67
Black women are subject to male domination under the law in marriage,
guardianship, succession, contract, and property. Under various custom-
ary laws still in effect, women are perpetual minors, and cannot engage
in contracts, acquire property, inherit, or marry without permission.6
Usually, men still pay a bride price known as lobolo, which some view as
the sale of the woman, and others view as insurance in the case of di-
vorce, or just as a symbol of agreement between families."t Some women
164 This subsection draws from Adrien Wing & Eunice de Carvalho, Black South Afri-
can Women: Towards Equal Rights, 8 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 57 (1995); Adrien Wing, A
Critical Race Feminist Conceptualization of Violence: South African and Palestinian
Women, 60 ALBANY L. REV. 943 (1997)[hereinafter Wing, Violence].
165 See HILDA BERNSTEIN, FOR THEIR TRIUMPHS AND FOR THEIR TEARS 7 (1985).
166 See Sharon Fon, Working Women's Health, in WOMEN'S HEALTH AND APARTHEID:
THE HEALTH OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE PRIMARY
HEALTH CARE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 20, 29 (Marica Wright et al. eds., 1988). White
women make up roughly eight percent of the population, Coloured women five percent,
and Indian women two percent of the population. See id.
167 See Celina Romany, Black Women and Gender Equality in a New South Africa:
Human Rights Law and the Intersection of Race and Gender, 21 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 857,
857 (1996).
168 See Wing & De Carvalho, supra note 164, at 64.
169 Lobolo is the payment of money from the man to the father of the bride. See J.C.
BEKKER, SEYMOUR'S CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 150-71 (1989) (discussing
the origin, purpose, and importance of lobolo). See generally Ian Currie, The Future of
Customary Law: Lessons from the Lobolo Debate, in GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AF-
RICAN LEGALORDER 146, 155 (Christina Murray ed., 1994); cf. Sandra Burman, Capital-
izing on African Strengths: Women, Welfare and the Law, in PUTTING WOMEN ON THE
AGENDA 103, 107-08 (Susan Bazilli ed., 1991) (arguing that South Africa should update
the lobolo practice in order to conform to its original purpose of providing a safety net
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view lobolo as a measure of their worth, a legitimation of their status in
the community, and not as a practice that oppresses them."7 Under cus-
tom, polygamy is legal to the extent that a man may have an unlimited
number of wives. While the civil law only recognizes monogamous mar-
riages, many blacks still marry under customary law. 7'
Black women suffer disproportionately from the poverty and politi-
cal exclusion experienced by the black population, since they bear the
brunt of the frustration and aggression that their husbands are powerless
to express elsewhere." This often manifests itself in the form of rape or
physical abuse.73 The legal definition of rape excluded spousal rape until
the enactment of the Prevention of Family Violence Act in 1993.74
White males still constitute the majority of employers or potential
employers and service providers for black women. 75 Many white women,
despite their own disadvantaged position in relation to white men, sup-
ported apartheid because it gave them privileges at the expense of the
black majority. 76 White women are also employers, especially of domes-
tics - a profession almost exclusively employing black females." Col-
oureds, Asians, and now even more blacks increasingly employ black
women in menial positions.
Nelson Mandela set the tone for equality in 1991 when he called for
the creation of a non-sexist state.'17 The permanent constitution makes it
for women and children); DIGBY SQHELO KOYANA, CUSTOMARY LAW IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY 4-5 (1980) (characterizing lobolo as a symbolic and traditional marriage cus-
tom).
170 See T.W. BENNETT, A SOURCEBOOK OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW FOR SOUTHERN
AFRICA 195, 198 (1991).
171 See Wing & De Carvalho, supra note 164, at 87.
172 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 23.
173 See Wing, Violence, supra note 164, at 954-59 (providing details concerning vio-
lence against black women in South Africa).
174 See PREVENTION OF FAMILY VIOLENCE ACT 133 OF 1993 (JSRSA) § 5. For a brief
discussion of this Act, see Vivienne Goldberg, South Africa: Private Law in Transi-
tion/The Effect of the New Constitution, 33 J. FAM. L. 495, 499-500 (1995).
175 Cf. Romany, supra note 167, at 865 (noting that black women fill the ranks of the
unskilled and lowest paid jobs).
176 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 11.
177 See Wing & De Carvalho, supra note 164, at 68 (noting that black women make up
86% of domestic workers, an occupation not subject to minimum wage); Romany, supra
note 167, at 865.
178 See Fighting Another Good Fight, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at B4.
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clear that the Bill of Rights binds all natural and juristic persons."7 The
equality clause has been broadened to make it clear that neither the state
nor any natural or juristic person may discriminate on the grounds of not
only sex or gender, which were in the interim constitution, but also preg-
nancy, marital status, or birth, all characteristics which disproportion-
ately affect women."
The equality clause makes it clear that affirmative action measures
may be undertaken; "[tlo promote the achievement of equality, legisla-
tive and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or cate-
gories of persons, disadvantages by unfair discrimination may be
taken."'' This provision ensures that disgruntled white men will not sue
for reverse discrimination. The Commission for Gender Equality was
established under Article 187, and is just now getting under way. It has
the power to promote respect for gender equality, and to monitor, inves-
tigate, research, educate, lobby, advise, and report on issues concerning
gender equality. These provisions are somewhat limited.83 The equality
provision has a new subsection that states discrimination on one of the
above grounds is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is
fair.183
The article on freedom of belief does permit for recognition of tradi-
tional marriages, as long as they are consistent with other provisions of
the Constitution. 'IWhile everyone has the right to practice and enjoy the
cultural life of their choice, this right must be consistent with the rest of
the constitution."3 A new law now allows the wife in a customary mar-
riage to own property and gives her half of the marital assets in case of
divorce. Husbands married only under customary law can continue to be
polygamous as long as the earlier wife agrees. It is highly likely, how-
ever, that the new law will remain unenforced in rural areas far from the
reach of the formal legal system."3
Additionally, Article 12, the revised article on freedom and security
of the person, now makes it clear that everyone has a right "to be free
from all forms of violence from either public or private sources," as well
179 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 8(2).
Iso See id. § 9(3); 1993 Interim Constitution, supra note 70, § 8(2).
181 See id. § 9(2).
"2 See id. §§ 7(3), 36.
"" See id. § 9(5).
184 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 15(3).
l' See id. §§ 30, 31.
186 See Suzanne Daley, In South Africa's Varied Rites, Equal Rights, N. Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 1999, at Al.
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as the right not to be tortured in any way."S The legislature has legalized
abortion in the early stages, and the gender jurisprudence of the Constitu-
tional Court includes an opinion in which it ruled that President Mandela
did not discriminate unfairly against fathers when he pardoned all female
prisoners with young children under twelve."
B. Women's Rights in Palestine"8
As with other aspects of Palestinian society during the autonomy pe-
riod, gender politics are in flux as well."9 Replicating the South African
constitution's textual commitment to gender equality will be difficult in
the Palestinian case because both Palestinian custom and Islamic tradi-
tion sanction differential treatment on the basis of gender. Under custom,
women are the repositories of family honor and the property of their
menfolk. If female chastity and purity is not maintained, it is a disgrace
for the family, 9' and her male relatives may be justified in killing the
offending party or even the woman herself if she is considered blame-
worthy." Like South Africa, a bride price or mahr is required to be paid.
It, however, is paid to the woman for her own use, rather than to her fam-
ily.
Under the Islamic heritage, as articulated in the Jordanian Personal
Status Law, women's legal status is improved over customary law. In-
stead of an unlimited number, men can only have four wives. 93 Women
can receive a divorce and maintenance if she has the necessary
grounds.' 94 Women can inherit a one-half share compared with no inheri-
1s7 See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 12.
188 See President of the Republic of South Africa, Minister of Correctional Services v.
John Philip Peter Hugo, CCT 11/96.
189 For further discussion of the same, see generally Wing, supra note 140.
190 See Lisa Taraki, Palestine: From National Liberation to Feminism, 5(3) MIDDLEE.
POL'Y. 173 (1997).
191 See PHILIPPA STRUM, THE WOMEN ARE MARCHING: THE SECOND SEX AND THE PAL-
ESTINIAN REVOLUTION 27 (1992).
'92 See ANGELA BENDT & JAMES DOWNING, WE SHALL RETURN: WOMEN OF PALESTINE
89 (Ann Henning trans., 1980).
193 See KORAN 4:3 (addressing polygamy). It is estimated that polygamy rates may be
5-10% in some villages. See STRUM, supra note 191, at 234.
194 The grounds for divorce are: impiety; incurable skin or sexual disease; mental ill-
ness; desertion of more than one year; inability to pay bride price; inability to provide
maintenance; or inability of wife to live with the husband. See JORDANIAN PERSONAL
STATUS LAW, Temporary Law no. 61/1976, Official Gazette no. 2668 of I Dec. 1976,
arts. 113-16, 120, 123, 126, 127, 132.
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tance rights under custom. 95 On the negative side, a woman can only
have one husband, cannot divorce easily, only gets half her male sib-
ling's share, and can be beaten by her husband." She can only marry a
Muslim, while a male can marry a Christian or Jewish woman and can
divorce easily." The alimony amount awarded is very minimal. 9 Cus-
tody of children is awarded to the mother only if the children are very
young. 9 While women do have the theoretical right in their marriage
contracts to specify divorce without judicial process if polygamy occurs,
or if she wants to work, such stipulations are rarely made.'
Custom and Islam have become intertwined over the centuries and
have been psychological refuges for many Palestinians during the various
Occupations, reinforcing the subservience of women. One of the few ar-
eas that subordinated men controlled was their women. As one man said
when asked why he would not let women have more freedom, "What is
left for us? We don't have land, homes or identity - at least let's have our
honour."' Nevertheless, the 1988 Palestine National Council Declara-
tion of Independence' expresses the desire to improve the legal status of
women.
The women's movement made some progress during the intifada, as
women were able to become more involved in the public sphere. 3 Inde-
pendent women's centers opened, including the Women's Studies Center
in Nablus and the Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling in
Gaza. In 1998, this latter organization spearheaded a three-day Model
19 See KORAN 4:11, 4:176 (addressing inheritance).
196 See KORAN 4:34 (discussing chastisement of a wife). The Jordanian Personal Status
Law does provide for divorce if a woman is beaten. JORDANIAN PERSONAL STATUS LAW,
supra note 194, art. 69; see also Wing, Violence, supra note 164, at 959-65 (detailing
domestic violence against Palestinian women).
197 See KORAN 2:237 (permitting easy divorce); Jordanian Personal Status Law, supra
note 194, art. 85.
192 See JORDANIAN PERSONAL STATUS LAw, supra note 194, art. 36.
19 See Mayer, supra note 50, at 141; Jordanian Personal Status Law, supra note 194,
arts. 162, 156.
200 A review of 8500 marriage contracts registered in the shari'a courts in the West
Bank over twenty years discovered only 1.5% contained any stipulations. See Lynn
Welchman, The Development of Islamic Family Law in the Legal System of Jordan, 37
INT'L & CoMp. L. Q. 868 (1988).
201 PAUL COSSAu & CLIVE ROBSON, STATELESS IN GAZA 38 (1986).
2 See Second Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine, reprinted in 4
PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 301 (1987/88).
23 See Wing, supra note 140 (elaborating on women's roles).
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Parliament on women's status and family law.' This parliament stirred
up a national debate that ended up necessitating a special conciliation
meeting where members of the parliament met with shari'a judges, intel-
lectuals, legislators, and members of political parties. The participants
agreed to work toward a unified Personal Status Code that would grant
women better legal protections, as well as "defend them from all forms
of violence; [and] reinforce the role and legitimacy of [the] shari'a
courts.""
Since the PNA has taken over, there have been some changes in the
legal regime. In 1996, the Women's Affairs Technical Committee was
successful in lobbying the Interior Ministry to rescind the laws that re-
quired women to have the approval of their husbands or male guardians
to obtain travel documents.'
Article 9 of the Basic Law contains an article stating that there can
be no discrimination between Palestinians because of gender.' On the
other hand, Article 4 states that Islam is the official religion, and Islamic
shari'a is a primary source of legislation.' This clause was added in the
sixth draft and is present in all Arab constitutions. Since Islam sanctions
the differential treatment of women, there is an inherent tension between
these two clauses.
The issue of improving women's constitutional status is a profound
one. Deeply rooted customary and religious attitudes are difficult to
eradicate through the passage of new laws, even if such laws are imposed
by newly elected popular regimes. Efforts to grant women a legal status
different from their social and cultural status often fail due to lack of le-
gitimacy in the community. While some sectors of society will favor
equalizing women's status, other sectors may vehemently oppose it. In
Palestine, sizable communities of Islamic fundamentalists and other tra-
ditionalists fall into this latter category.
In addition to the equality and anti-discrimination clauses already
present in the Basic Law, the PLC should adopt additional reforms fol-
lowing the South African model. There should be a clause that discusses
the need for affirmative action programs or other positive measures to
improve the status of women. A Gender Commission should be consid-
ered as well. The Basic Law does not contain a provision concerning pri-
204 See Nahlo Abdo, Gender and Politics Under the Palestinian Authority, 28 (2) J.
PALESTINE STUD. 38, 45 (1999).
' Id. at 46.
206 See id. at 44.
27 BASIC LAW art. 9.
20' Id. art. 4.
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vate violence as the South African constitution does. Article 13 makes it
clear that no person shall be subjected to coercion or torture.0 This arti-
cle, however, is located in a series of provisions pertaining to criminal
due process rights, so it may ultimately be found inapplicable in the do-
mestic violence context.
In 1994, the General Union of Palestinian Women published a Dec-
laration of Principles on Palestinian Women's Rights, which goes beyond
anything proposed in the Basic Law. Its general provision on civil rights
states that "the law should stand next to the women to protect her family
from violence and practices that infringe on any of her guaranteed rights,
• . . by guaranteeing her right to go to a court as a citizen with full
rights." ' Could this be interpreted to protect her from domestic vio-
lence? The provision on economic, social and cultural rights "affirms the
importance of equality in social welfare ... and the guarantee of her full
equality regarding issues pertaining to personal status. 21'
All these proposals may generate substantial resistance, but should
be countered with arguments for the legitimacy of gender equality. Else-
where, I propose three types of justifications for legal reform in this area:
reinterpretation of the shari'a, compliance with international human
rights norms, and the changes wrought in Palestinian society by the inti-
fada and the current period.
After the adoption of the Basic Law, the PNA should take steps to
implement Article 10 of the Basic Law requiring the incorporation of
international declarations that protect human rights. An important treaty
to ratify is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (Women's Convention). This document is criti-
cally important since it covers the private sphere, where most women
spend the majority of their time and where a large amount of discrimina-
tion takes place. The Convention contains fifteen articles describing the
areas in which states must employ "appropriate means" to safeguard
women's rights, including the areas of education, health care, nationality,
209 Id. art. 13.
210 See Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Women's Rights, reprinted in 24 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 137 (1994)[hereinafter Declaration]. For an analysis of the Declaration,
see also Suha Sabbagh, The Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Women's Rights:
An Analysis, in PALESTINIAN WOMEN: GAZA AND THE WEST BANK 245 (Suha Sabbagh
ed., 1998).
211 See Declaration, supra note 210, at para. 4.
212 See generally Wing, supra note 140.
213 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doe. A/34/180
(1979) (adopted Dec. 18, 1979).
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culture, family and personal status, legal and political activity, employ-
ment, recreation, and mortgages and other forms of credit. Affirmative
action is permitted, but "shall be discontinued when the objectives of
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved."2"4 The PLC
should consider adopting these provisions, especially those affecting the
private sphere.
V. CONCLUSION
The Palestinians clearly face difficult diplomatic, political, eco-
nomic, and legal conditions as the Oslo Accord-mandated five-year
autonomy period ends. It remains uncertain whether the Palestinian peo-
ple living in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem will obtain the
viable independent state they so clearly want as the end result of the
peace process. Despite these severe difficulties, my preliminary analysis
indicates that the Basic Law constitutes an embryonic attempt at creating
a democratic foundation in whatever part of Palestine the PNA will gov-
ern as an independent state. To support this conclusion, this Article first
explored the cultural and structural factors influencing democratization
and the constitutional process, with particular attention to the unipolar
world order, national economy, education, political pluralization, com-
munitarian/hierarchical society, distrust of authority, and the multilay-
ered legal regime. The Article then highlighted certain strengths and
weaknesses of various textual features of the Basic Law, referring to les-
sons that might be drawn from the new South African constitution. The
features discussed included: parliament as a constituent assembly, su-
premacy of the constitution, judicial review and a Constitutional Court, a
competent civil service, protection of public safety, enshrining of consti-
tutional principles, repeal of unjust laws, and the protection of human
rights. The thumb nail sketch of the specific case study of women's
rights suggested that Palestine should follow So,.'h Africa's lead and
overcome the legacy of sexism by adopting a more detailed equal rights
provision in the constitution and other reforms. I leave to later scholar-
ship a further discussion of the issues introduced in this Symposium Ar-
ticle. That elaboration will hopefully include an analysis of the first few
operating years of the Basic Law of an independent state of Palestine.
214 Id. pt. I, art. 4. Special measures protecting pregnancy are allowed. As broad as the
Convention is, it does not cover abortion, pornography, domestic violence, or marital
rape.
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